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ABSTRACT
Through the example of illicit sales of weapons and
sensitive materials, this thesis shows how an economic theory
of organized crime can be used to understand and predict the
behavior of organized crime groups in Russia. The author
assumes that organized crime groups are rational, "corporate
like" entities, that seek to maximize profits and minimize the
risks involved in attaining those profits. Therefore, they
assess the opportunities, risks and potential benefits of
committing crimes. Furthermore, the assessment is entirely
dependent on the condition of the environments in which they
must operate.
When this theory is applied to Russia, it shows that
Russia's political, economic, state security, and social
environments are well suited to the illicit sale of weapons
and sensitive materials. This is due to the increased
opportunities, decreased risks, and huge potential benefits
associated with these illicit activities in Russia today. As
a result of this analysis, recommendations can be made that
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Since the fall of the Former Soviet Union (FSU) , Russia
has witnessed a tremendous increase in organized crime. One
of the most recent activities of Russia's organized crime
groups is the illicit sale of weapons and sensitive materials.
As a result, these groups now pose a significant threat to
regional and international security with obvious implications
for U.S. land, air and naval forces. Nevertheless, when
organized crime groups in Russia are viewed as rational,
"corporate like" entities, that seek to maximize profits and
minimize risks, then the reason for these activities can be
understood. Russia's organized crime groups assess the
opportunities, risks and benefits of committing crimes.
Furthermore, their assessment is dependent on the status of
Russia's political, economic, state security, and social
environments. Therefore, this thesis provides an analysis of
Russia's environments and shows how they impact organized
crime groups' assessment of opportunities, risks and benefits,
resulting in their decision to sell weapons and sensitive
materials
.
When organized crime groups survey Russia's political
environment, they see chaos. Not only is there a lack of
strong, consistent leadership in this environment, there is
political infighting, and a large bureaucracy rife with
corruption. This is convenient for crime groups because they
vi
can continue with their activities virtually unobstructed, in
addition to easily bribing officials.
The status of Russia's economic environment is equally as
poor. There is a general lack of fiscal responsibility, low
productivity, a failure to convert inefficient industries, and
an inability to effectively privatize enterprises.
Consequently, the debilitated economic environment provides
increased opportunities for organized crime groups. Some of
these opportunities are the ability to acquire privatized
enterprises or loans that will never be repaid. Specifically
related to weapons, the state of this environment gives crime
groups an opportunity to acquire surplus arms produced by
unconverted industries.
The state security environment is probably in the worst
condition. This environment has problems plaguing the law
enforcement, court and prison systems, legal code,
import/export control apparatus, and those involved in the
physical security of state property. In addition, there is a
large degree of political interference and widespread
corruption in this environment. This situation greatly
reduces the amount of risk for organized crime groups. When
the police are ill -equipped, the courts overburdened,
"loopholes" exist in the law, and prisons overcrowded, these
groups have little fear of getting caught, prosecuted, or
punished. As for opportunities to commit crimes, weapons and
such are poorly protected making them easy targets for theft.
vii
Combined with the vast corruption in this environment these
thefts are made even easier to accomplish.
Finally, Russia's social environment has its problems as
well. To begin with, Russian society has been demoralized by
the loss of the imperial status that it held in the FSU. In
addition, Russian society is fearful of things that may result
in the reappearance of an authoritarian system. Moreover, a
declining morality, shaped by over 70 years of trying to "get
around" the system, makes the people more willing to commit
crimes in order to survive. Simply put, the condition of the
social environment spells little chance for significant
reforms in Russia; Thus, less of a chance that organized crime
groups will be adversely effected.
To better focus the efforts aimed at stopping
proliferation by Russia's organized crime groups, the obvious
recommendation is to continue reforming the environments.
This can be accomplished by doing such things as stopping
political infighting, slowing inflation, or building a legal
infrastructure. More specific recommendations would be to
open new businesses instead of converting inefficient ones,
have better cooperation between the investigative and
intelligence functions in the state security environment, and
obtain an accurate inventory of all weapons and sensitive
materials. No matter what is done to fight proliferation by
Russia's organized crime groups, it is clear that time cannot
be wasted and reform must continue.
Vlll
I . INTRODUCTION
One of the most pressing issues concerning Russia today is
the presence of organized crime groups that dramatically
increased in size and scope of activities since the fall of
communism and the collapse of the Former Soviet Union (FSU)
.
Although organized crime groups were well established
throughout the FSU since the Bolshevik revolution, the
repressive nature of the Soviet system kept most of their
activities within the realm of providing black market
industrial and consumer goods. The end of the FSU however,
did not bring about the end of these highly resilient
organized crime groups. On the contrary, the deteriorated
state of Russia's political, economic, state security, and
social environments have allowed organized crime groups to
broaden their size and the scope of their criminal ventures.
Consequently, one of the most recent and disturbing criminal
undertakings by these groups is the illicit sale of weapons,
weapons components, strategic and nuclear materials, and
technologies with military applications. This situation poses
a significant threat to regional and international security,
a threat that, if left unchecked, may jeopardize many of the
potential gains achieved by the fall of communism and the end
of the FSU.
The fact that weapons and sensitive materials are being
sold on the black market should not be a surprise. By
1
definition, Russia's crime groups are organized, rational,
almost "corporate like" enterprises, with a primary goal of
maximization of profits. And if this is true, then their
activities are essentially being determined by an assessment
process . This process involves the assessment of
opportunities to commit various crimes, the risks involved in
committing those crimes, and the potential benefits to be
gained. Moreover, the results of this process (or the
criminal activities chosen to be committed) are dependent on
the state of the environments in which organized crime groups
operate. In other words, organized crime groups in Russia are
basically surveying the status of Russia's political,
economic, state security, and social environments and
assessing the best crimes to commit based on the
opportunities, risks, and potential benefits that are
presented.
Hence, it will be the purpose of this thesis to use an
economic theory of organized crime to show why some organized
crime groups in Russia (as well as the "near abroad" 1 ) are
engaging in the illicit sale of weapons, weapons components,
strategic and nuclear materials, and technologies with
military applications. In order to accomplish this task, the
thesis will first present a general theory of how organized
crime groups make decisions. It will then be demonstrated how
'Although this thesis focusses on Russia, much of the
information presented also applies to the "near abroad."
this theory can be used to understand the activities of
organized crime groups in Russia; and more specifically, their
illicit sale of weapons and sensitive materials. This section
will then be followed by a description of organized crime in
Russia during the Soviet period and how it exists in Russia
today. Next, a description and analysis of Russia's
political, economic, state security, and social environments
will be presented. Within each of these sections there will
be further analysis of how organized crime groups can take
advantage and benefit from the status of the environments.
This will lead into the next section of the thesis which
provides an overview of the market for illicit sales of
weapons and sensitive materials by organized crime groups in
Russia. Following this will be an analysis of the threats to
regional and international security presented by illicit sales
of this nature. The thesis then concludes with a summary of
the organized crime situation in Russia, an overview of what
is being done to combat these groups, and some predictions for
the future.
Doing research on this particular topic is somewhat
difficult since accurate information on the nature and
activities of organized crime groups is not readily available.
This problem is further compounded by the fact that these
groups are in the FSU; an area of the world that until quite
recently would not admit to having organized crime groups.
Moreover, whatever information that can be attained is based
on activities where the perpetrator is caught or where the
illicit activity is discovered. Concerning statistics,
inconsistent reporting methods used in the FSU are resulting
in figures that vary widely depending on the source and have
a tendency to understate actual activity. Therefore, all of
the statistics cited in this thesis are meant to be indicators
of particular activities or behavior, not concrete
descriptions of them.
Considering the above difficulties in researching
organized crime groups in Russia, this thesis was accomplished
by using an economic theory of organized crime as a base and
then carefully looking at the available empirical data from a
wide range of sources to assess the applicability of the
theory. A great deal of the source material came from various
newspapers, journals, magazines, the Foreign Broadcast
Information Service (FBIS) , and other periodical literature
covering the mid-1980s to the present time. The bulk of these
references however, were written between 1989 and 1994 because
it was during this period of time that the best information
about contemporary organized crime in addition to organized
crime during the Soviet period could be found. Several books
were also used, but they mostly aided in researching the
theory portion of the thesis. Moreover, books describing
contemporary organized crime groups in Russia were simply not
available. Last of all, interviews with several experts in
such areas as organized crime in Russia, nuclear issues, and
economics were conducted to obtain the best possible
information and analysis of Russia's environments and its
organized crime groups.
II. A SIMPLE ECONOMIC THEORY OF ORGANIZED CRIME
Organized crime, for purposes of this thesis, can be
defined as an on- going criminal enterprise, carried out by a
conspiratorial cohort that is organized by lines of authority
and linked to corruption by officials. 2 Its main goal is
achieving maximum material income subject to the constraints
of available opportunities and potential risks of
prosecution. This definition is further strengthened by an
insightful list of characteristics of organized crime groups
provided by author Larry J. Siegel in his text on criminology.
According to Mr. Siegel, organized crime groups are:
conspiratorial; usually organized along hierarchial lines; has
economic gain as its primary goal; is not limited to providing
illicit services; may engage in sophisticated activities; uses
predatory tactics; is quick and adept at control and
discipline; has a reputation for violence; is not synonymous
with the Mafia (Mafias are a subset of organized crime
groups) ; does not include terrorists seeking political change;
uses hijacking of shipments and cargo theft as other sources
of income; engages in the fencing of high value items; and can
maintain international sales territories. 3
interview with Scott Norwood, Professor of Organization and
Management, San Jose State University, by David M. Lowy, on 28
January 1994.
3Larry J. Siegel, Criminology (New York: West Publishing
Company, 1986), pp. 384-385 and 388-389.
The above definition and list of characteristics of
organized crime groups or criminal enterprises illustrates
that they are rational entities with a desire to achieve
maximum benefits with a minimum amount of risk. It is not a
coincidence that this situation is very similar to the cost-
benefit analysis done by non- criminal enterprises before
conducting a normal business transaction. 4 Yet, identifying
this similarity in the decision making process of criminal and
non- criminal enterprises is nothing new. Ever since noted
economist Gary S. Becker published his article on this very
subject in 1968, expanding the use of economic theory to
explain the occurrence of many forms of crime, including its
more organized forms, has been very popular. 5
Becker's economic approach to crime basically states that
individual criminals as well as organized crime groups assess
the opportunities to commit various crimes, the risks involved
in committing those crimes, and the potential benefits to be
William J. Baumol , Economic Theory And Operations Analysis
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1972), pp. 319-321.
5Despite the many similarities between criminal and non-
criminal enterprises, it is the method by which the two groups
accomplish their objectives that sets them apart from each other.
Ordinary corporations and businesses will engage in legitimate
business activities through legitimate means. Organized crime
groups on the other hand, will engage in illegitimate business
activities through illegitimate means, or legitimate business
activities through illegitimate means.
gained if they are committed. 6 In addition, he implies that
this assessment process is dependent upon the status of the
environments in which criminals or organized crime groups are
required to operate. This is because it is within the
environments (political, economic, state security, and
social) 7 that opportunities, risks, and potential benefits are
to be found. It logically follows that any changes in the
status of these environments would undoubtedly impact the
outcome of the assessment process that organized crime groups
engage in before committing a crime. For example, an increase
or decrease in the effectiveness of some part of the state
security environment in detecting a particular crime, would be
met with a subsequent increase or decrease in the amount of
risk associated with committing that crime. Ultimately, an
organized crime group would then have to decide whether or not
the increase or decrease in risk justifies the potential
benefits they could receive by engaging in the illegal
activity.
In sum, the economic theory of organized crime that will
be the basis of this thesis states: Crime groups, being
organized, rational, "corporate like" entities, will engage in
6Gary S. Becker, "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach,"
The Journal of Political Economy . March/April 1968, pp. 169-180 and
201-209.
7The term "environments" can be broken down into many different
categories. Yet, in this thesis the basic categories were best
encompassed under the headings of political, economic, state
security, and social.
8
a process of assessing the opportunities, risks and potential
benefits of committing various crimes. Moreover, the outcome
of this assessment process is entirely dependent upon the
environments in which these groups operate. In that,
increases or decreases in the quality and effectiveness of the
environments will be reflected in increases or decreases in
the amount of opportunities for organized crime groups to
commit various crimes, the amount of risk to those groups in
committing those crimes, and the potential benefits to be
gained if they commit those crimes. It is worth noting
however, that organized crime groups cannot be assumed to have
perfect knowledge of their environments. Therefore, these
criminal enterprises do not always make correct assessments. 8
For if organized crime groups always assessed things
correctly, they would be caught even less then they are now.
Consequently, this theory may be used to provide valuable
insight into the reasons why criminal enterprises engage in
different types of activities, and possibly predict their
future behavior. To do this, a researcher would just have to
analyze the environments that an organized crime groups
operates within, and then go through the same assessment
process to determine the opportunities, costs and potential
benefits of various crimes. Unfortunately, the researcher is
8Richard F. Sullivan, "The Economics of Crime; An Introduction
To The Literature, " in An Economic Analysis Of Crime: Selected
Readings




limited by the same lack of perfect knowledge in analyzing the
environments that organized crime groups are. As a result,
the researcher is left to rely upon patterns of criminal
behavior and activity, making the best possible
interpretations and predictions based on the available
information.
Nonetheless, this theory can be quite useful in
understanding and explaining the illicit activities of
organized crime groups in Russia. In order to accomplish this
task, one need only illustrate how the conditions of Russia's
political, economic, state security, and social environments
have impacted: 1) the opportunities to commit various crimes;
2) the risks associated with committing those crimes; and 3)
the potential benefits to be gained from committing those
crimes. In doing this, a clearer understanding of why these
various types of crime are being committed can be attained.
More specifically, by applying the economic theory of
organized crime to Russia, insight can be gained as to why
organized crime groups in Russia are venturing into the
illicit sales of weapons, weapons components, strategic and
nuclear materials, and technologies with military
applications. If an analysis of Russia's political, economic,
state security, and social environments concludes that there
are increased opportunities, decreased risks and/or sufficient
potential benefits in committing crimes involving weapons and
sensitive materials, then a rise in these types of crime
10
should be expected. On the other hand, if an analysis of
Russia's environments shows that there are decreased
opportunities, higher risks, and/or low potential benefits to
be gained in committing crimes of this nature, then a decline
in these types of crime would be expected.
11
III. DESCRIPTION OF ORGANIZED CRIME IN RUSSIA
A. SOVIET PERIOD
Organized crime groups in Russia and the rest of the FSU
(until 1991, few accounts distinguished between the two)
existed in one form or another during the entire Soviet
period. During the Bolshevik revolution in 1917, organized
crime groups, comprised of predominantly thieves and
murderers, used their skills to aid the Bolsheviks9 . During
the 1920s, when cooperatives were allowed by the New Economic
Policy, organized crime groups frequently engaged in extorting
protection money from wealthy businessmen10 . However, the
fact that the Soviet economic system failed to meet the needs
of the state or the average Soviet citizen created an
environment that enabled organized crime groups to develop the
complex black market network for which they are best known.
By providing industrial goods to the state, and consumer goods
that were not readily available in state stores to citizens,
organized crime groups were able to integrate themselves into
Soviet society. As the black market system grew, organized
crime groups grew with it and eventually became, "the
9Stephen Handelman, "Why Capitalism and the Mafiya Mean
Business," The New York Times Magazine . 24 January 1993, pp. 38 and
40.
10David Remnick, "Violent Mobsters Strong-Arm New Soviet
Cooperatives," The Washington Post . 12 February 1989, Sec. A, p.
36, col. 1.
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lubricant that made the inefficient Soviet economy run." 11
The power of organized crime groups and the black market
system they had mastered was further aided in the 1970s and
early 1980s by the enormous corruption of political elites in
the Brezhnev regime that "sponsored" their activities. 12
There were other types of crime being committed in Russia;
yet, the repressive nature of the Soviet police state always
managed to limit most activities of organized crime groups to
satisfying Soviet industrial and consumer needs.
Following his rise to power in the mid 1980s, Mikhail
Gorbachev implemented the policies of glasnost and perestroika
aimed at the social and economic restructuring of the Soviet
Union. These policies allowed a fundamental shift in the
nature and character of organized crime groups in Russia and
the types of activities they engaged in. To begin with,
Gorbachev's campaign against alcoholism opened up a new and
extremely lucrative market for organized crime. "It created
much the same effect as Prohibition did in the United States
as a new wave of bootleggers and bathtub vodka-makers cashed
in." 13 Gorbachev's revival of cooperatives was countered by
organized crime group's revival of protection and extortion
"Handelman, "Why Capitalism," p. 40.
12Arkady Vaksberg, The Soviet Mafia , trans. John and Elizabeth
Roberts (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991). This book provides
an excellent account of Brezhnev era organized crime.
13Jack Anderson and Dale Van Atta, "Underworld Undermining




rackets. Organized crime groups also used cooperatives to
launder money 14 and facilitate their entrance into legitimate
business. Nevertheless, there were marked increases in other
illegal activities including narcotics, prostitution,
gambling 15 and the bribery of state officials and managers of
state enterprises. 16
Like their counterparts in other countries, they have
allotted spheres of influence, they control
cooperatives, markets and groups of speculators,
foreign currency speculators and prostitutes, and they
are engaged in swindles involving the sale of




As a result of easing restrictions on travel in and out of
the Soviet Union, organized crime groups were also beginning
to forge relationships, "mostly of a businesslike character,"
with foreign nations and other organized crime groups. 18 For
example, Soviet organized crime groups began to establish
connections with the alleged base of a criminal underworld in
14Fred Coleman, "The Mobsters of Moscow: Reform Opens Up a New
Field For Organized Crime," Newsweek . 31 October 1988, p. 44.
15Gambling was legalized in some areas of the FSU.
16Francis X. Clines, "Cops and Robbers, Gangs and Vice; Moscow
Finds Out It Has Them All," The New York Times . 6 December 1990,
Sec. A, p. 20, col. 1.
17David E. Powell, "Soviet Society," in Soviet Update. 1989-
1990 , eds . Anthony Jones and David E. Powell (San Francisco:
Westview Press, 1991), p. 64.
18Francis X. Clines, "Soviets Find Organized Crime Gaining
Hold," The New York Times . 14 June 1989, Sec. A, p. 14, col. 1.
14
the Soviet emigre community of Brighton Beach in Brooklyn, New
York. 19
There were also significant changes in the nature and
character of organized crime groups. First of all, they were
becoming more and more violent . This change was not only
represented in the commission of more violent crimes;
organized crime groups were beginning to use terrorist like
tactics, carry weapons, and engage in shoot -outs. This can be
explained by their desire to maintain or expand their spheres
of influence. 20 These spheres of influence were divided by
territory and/or market for criminal activity. 21 In some
instances ethnicity played a role in determining the territory
or market for organized crime groups, but it was not a
requirement. All this aside, a shortage of police officers,
and the misuse of the existing police force, only made matters
worse. 22 Further compounding the situation was an inadequate
legal system riddled with loopholes. To add insult to injury,
the ability to bribe state officials made it even easier for
members of organized crime groups to avoid prosecution. It is
no wonder that, between 19 86 and 19 89, 2,607 criminal groups
19Ibid.
20Natasha Lebedeva, "A Long, Bloody Summer, " Newsweek . 3




exhibiting the characteristics of criminal organizations were
identified in the FSU. 23
B . CONTEMPORARY
The current phase in the evolution of organized crime
groups in Russia began with the collapse of communism and the
fall of the FSU in August of 1991. For these groups, the
resulting political, economic, state security, and social
instability has fueled their continued progression towards a
capitalist, entrepreneurial, and predatory orientation. In
effect, Russia provides an environment well suited to the
needs and desires of organized crime groups. This fact can be
seen in the dramatic increase in the number of criminal groups
operating throughout Russia. Independent experts from the
Russian corporation, RAU, published a study revealing that for
the year 1992,
More than 4,000 organized criminal groups were brought
to light in Russia, including more than 1,000 with
international and interregional connections. One
group out of four enjoys the protection of corrupt
bureaucrats in various state structures. 24
Another report states that as of December 1993, the Moscow
region alone has 156 organized crime groups. Of those 156
^"How to Fight Boom in Organized Crime?," The Current Digest
Of The Soviet Press . 19 Apr 1989, p. 2.
24
"Crime Wave, Corruption What Can Be Done?," The Current
Digest Of The Post Soviet Press . 10 March 1993, p. 12.
16
groups, 72 of them have teamed up to form 21 larger groups. 25
Although accurate statistics are difficult to obtain,
estimates reflect that the number of organized crime groups
has nearly doubled since the mid-1980s.
Besides increased numbers, these figures point to the
degree of complexity and sophistication organized crime groups
have achieved in recent years. To begin with, there has been
a dramatic increase in the amount of confirmed international
connections organized crime groups in Russia now possess.
According to the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI)
,
United States connections for Russian/Eurasian organized crime
groups include the cities of New York, Miami, Los Angeles,
Chicago, and several others. 26 Organized crime groups in
Russia also have connections to other organized crime groups
in Israel, Belgium, Poland, and Austria just to name a few. 27
Besides the obvious benefits of having an international sales
territory for black market commodities, these international
connections are also used for bringing in people to do "muscle
"Larisa Kislinskaya, "Russian Gangs Join Forces in War Over
Spheres of Influence," Tass . 15 December 1993.
26Interview with experts from the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, European/Asian Unit, by David M. Lowy, 16 December
1993.
27
"Russian Mafia Reportedly Increasing Activities," from DIE
WELT, in Daily Report Western Europe . FBIS-WEU-94-027, 9 February
1994.
17
work" or perform "hits." 28 Another example of complexity and
sophistication is that larger organized crime groups in Russia
are beginning to take over and eliminate smaller competing
groups. These smaller groups are then forced by necessity to
offer their services to the larger group. 29
For organized crime groups in Russia, taking over
competing crime groups has allowed them to engage in the same
crimes they have committed in the past, while also seeking new
highly lucrative territories and markets to exploit. These
new markets range from cocaine trafficking in Moscow to
infiltration of the taxi and tourist businesses in St.
Petersburg. Financial crimes, however, seem to be one of the
largest growth activities for organized crime groups in
Russia. Financial crimes include such things as banking
crimes, counterfeiting, embezzlement, and illegal bank
acquisitions. Organized crime groups in Russia have engaged
in false check and other bank transaction schemes, and even
opened up their own banks to launder money. 30 In 1992, an
organized crime group in the Chechen Republic attempted to
steal over 25 billion rubles from the Russian State Bank. Had
they succeeded, experts believe it would have caused the
28Interview with William Pollard, Detective, Los Angeles Police
Department Organized Crime Intelligence Division, by David M. Lowy,
17 December 1993.
29Handelman, "Why Capitalism," p. 34.
30Lebedeva, p. 39.
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collapse of Russia's already weakened monetary system. 31 All
that aside, the perpetrators managed to steal over $700
million before being caught. 32 On top of that, "the Russian
mafia helped make $12 billion 'disappear' from the country's
primitive banking system this year (1993). " 33
There are essentially four major classifications of
criminals that make up the membership of the various organized
crime groups in Russia today. These classifications are: 1)
Career criminals that make their living solely from criminal
activity; 2) Opportunistic criminals that engage in criminal
activities on a very limited or one time basis; 3) Corrupt
officials that engage in criminal activities to enrich
themselves or to increase their power or status; and 4)
Juveniles, who are young and immature and their activities do
not reach the complexity of the others types of criminals. 34
As for the types of organized crime groups, there have been
many attempts to classify them to no avail. Probably the best
way to categorize organized crime groups in Russia is just to
3IHandelman, "Why Capitalism," p. 15.
32Andrew Jennings, "From Marx to the Mafia," New Statesman &
Society
. 14 May 1993, p. 18.
33Dorinda Elliot, Michael Elliot, Kari Huus, Melinda Liu,
Andrew Nagorsky, Tim Padgett, Steven Strasser, Scott Sullivan,
Niccolo Viverelli, and Douglas Waller, "Global Mafia, " Newsweek . 13
December 1993, p. 30.
34Norwood.
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say that it has to do with spheres of influence. 35 Basically,
the four classifications of criminals listed above will come
together in various manners to form an organized crime groups
based on a combination of such things as territory, market and
ethnicity. Each factor may or may not figure into the
formation of a particular organized crime group, and no one
factor is more important than any other.
""Strategic, Radioactive Materials Smuggling," from
KOMMERSANT, in Daily Report Central Eurasia , FBIS-USR-94- 001, 5
January 1994.
20
IV. POLITICAL ENVIRONMENTAL ANALYSIS
Russia's political environment can be characterized as
nothing less than chaotic. The country is currently
experiencing the pain and frustration of leaving behind an
authoritarian past on a path towards the tenets of democracy
and a free-market economy. Nonetheless, it has been a very-
rough road politically, and Russia still has a long way to go.
Unfortunately, the great degree of turmoil and lack of a
functioning government that currently characterizes Russia's
political environment is at the same time providing great
opportunities for organized crime groups.
To begin with, Russia has not found stable and consistent
leadership in its President, Boris Yeltsin.
One of the few features common to successfully
reforming countries has been a leader with a clear
sense of where he wants his country to go and a
willingness to stick by his purpose when the going
gets rough - Vaclav Klaus, or Lech Walesa, for
example. 36
If providing a clear and consistent vision of Russia's future
and then sticking with it under pressure is the sign of an
ideal leader for the Russian people, then Yeltsin does not fit
the bill. When Yeltsin first emerged on the political scene,
he set his sights on "modernizing the Soviet Communist Party.
"
36
"The road to ruin," The Economist . 29 January 1994, p. 24
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Failing in this task, he dawned the appearance of a "Russian
revivalist" and successfully aided Russia in emerging as a
separate and distinct nation following the collapse of the
Soviet Union. Amidst strong popular support, President
Yeltsin put on his third "face," that of a liberal democrat.
With this change, he began the tremendous undertaking of
bringing Russia into the West. In order to do this, Yeltsin
initiated a wide range of economic and political reforms with
the hopes of bringing Russia closer to democracy and a free-
market economy. Yet, it now appears that this particular
undertaking is going to be beyond his capabilities. Due to
political fallout, he is backing-off of the reform process.
As a result, Yeltsin's "fourth incarnation" has become that of
a "neo- conservative. " Unfortunately, this is a "face" that
advocates a strong Russian state, at the expense of continued
democratic and free-market reforms. 37
Mr. Yeltsin's inconsistent pattern of leadership is not
the only cause of Russia's political turmoil. On the
contrary, there are other geopolitical problems in Russia that
have contributed to the deteriorating political situation of
the country. These problems have also had a large part in
determining the character of Yeltsin's leadership, which
culminated in his most recent change from liberal democrat to
"neo- conservative.
"
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One of the biggest problems has been the paralyzing effect
of the fighting between president and parliament. 38 This is
due to the fact that Russia has had no tradition of democracy
to draw guidance from. Moreover, Russia has been left to
utilize government institutions inherited from the now-defunct
Soviet Union, a direct result of Russia's inability to develop
governmental institutions of its own. However, the crux of
the problems between the executive and legislative branches
can be traced back to Russia's ill-conceived and constantly
amended constitution. By not providing a clear division of
powers, the constitution left presidential and parliamentary
forces in a continuous battle for "control over monetary,
fiscal and industrial policy." 39 And as a result, the
political system was undermined as one faction disregarded and
ignored the programs, decrees, and/or laws developed and put-
forth by the other faction. 40 This situation finally came to
a head in October 1993, when Yeltsin enlisted the aid of the
military to forcibly dissolve the Parliament.
Unfortunately, dissolving the Parliament did not turn out
to be the cure for Russia's political problems as hoped. The
new parliamentary elections were held on 12 December 1993.
The overall reform effort in Russia was dealt a tremendous
38Steven Erlanger, "In Kremlin, Hints and Allegations:
Corruption, Real or Not, Has Paralyzed Russia's Government," The
New York Times . 25 August 1993, Sec. A, p. 5.
39
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blow when the pro-reform political parties (Russia's Choice,
the Yavlinsky-Boldyrev-Lukin bloc, the Party of Russian Unity
and Concord, and the Russian Movement for Democratic Reform)
failed to get a majority of seats in the State Duma, Russia's
relatively powerful lower chamber of Parliament. 41 This can
be attributed to Yeltsin's failure to create a presidential
party of reform, and the fact that the reform candidates were
very poor politicians. 42 As a result, the voters' disgust
over such things as a declining standard of living and a
general break- down of law and order, led to a victory by the
anti- reform blocs (Liberal Democratic Party, Communist Party
of the Russian Federation, and the Agrarian Party)
.
43 Led by
the ultra- nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky, who also fared
very well in the elections, the anti -reform blocs "have formed
a tactical alliance only three votes short of a majority." 44
Consequently, President Yeltsin has been saddled with a new
Russian parliament that may cause as much friction between
president and parliament as its predecessor.
To make matters worse, the political forces that support
the continued existence of the grossly inefficient military
industrial complex have reasserted themselves as well. For
41Vera Tolz, "Russia's Parliamentary Elections: What Happened
and Why," RFE/RL Research Report . 14 January 1994, p. 1.
42
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43Tolz, p. 4-5.
44
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their support in disbanding the Russian parliament in October
1993, Yeltsin granted the Russian military a bigger role in
governmental decision making. 45 This move has already
manifested itself in promises of increased defense spending to
accompany a highly "ambitious" military doctrine. In
addition, the Ministry of Defense has been made exempt from
customs duties on military hardware sales abroad. 46
Moreover, representatives of the industrial sector have
organized themselves into an effective lobbying group, and
have already found a "friend" in Prime Minister Viktor
Chernomyrdin
.
This, unelected bureaucrat- turned -prime minister has
packed his team with men from industrial interest
groups whose party, Civic Union, did not win a single
seat in the proportional -representation part of last
months [12 December 1993] election. 47
Chernomyrdin has forced key reformers like Yegor Gaidar and
Boris Federov out of government and currently endorses the
continued use of inflationary subsidies to inefficient
industries. Yet, these types of political change are by no
means new to Russia.
45Stephen Foye, "Updating Russian Civil -Military Relations,"
RFE/RL Research Report , 19 November 1993, p. 44.
46Marat Salimov, "Defense Ministry gets export privileges,"
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47
"The mess in Moscow," The Economist , 29 January 1994, p. 13.
25
Since the Russians embarked on economic reform in
January 1992, they have had three prime ministers,
four finance ministers, two central -bank governors,
two parliaments, five governments and umpteen changes
of policy. 48
The Russian government has also contributed to the long
list of problems plaguing the political environment by
continuing to maintain a very large bureaucracy. The Russian
bureaucracy tends to overlap and over- regulate, and the
general consensus is that, "Too many ministries and agencies
make things worse. Only a few are effective." 49 Furthermore,
the bureaucracy is suffering a "brain drain, " as low pay and
low prestige are driving the only people with talent into the
private sector. Of those that remain, many are engaging in
corrupt practices to make up for what the government does not
pay them. 50 Through the imposition of complex regulatory
processes and licensing requirements that characterize the
bureaucracy, civil servants encourage the offering of bribes
in return for special considerations. 51 According to the
Ministry of Internal Security, of the 2,700 corruption cases
uncovered in 1992, two- thirds involved civil servants. 52
48Ibid.
49
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There has also been numerous allegations of corruption in the
upper echelons of power; reaching as high as the former
Russian Vice President, Aleksandr Rutskoi, and several other
senior ministers. Regardless of the truth of these
allegations (most are seen as little more than political mud-
slinging) , they serve to further undermine an already weak
political system53
For organized crime groups in Russia, the political
situation means increased opportunities to commit various
crimes. While the political leadership of the country remains
inconsistent and continually engaged in petty bickering and
in- fighting, organized crime groups are able to conduct their
illicit activities virtually unobstructed. Moreover, these
groups can act with little fear that the political environment
will allow enough reforms to be instituted to threaten them
anytime in the near future. In addition, the vast amount of
corruption at all levels of the political environment merely
facilitate the completion of illegal acts by organized crime
groups. As stated in the definition of organized crime, links
to corrupt officials is very important to the success of the
criminal enterprise. And if this is true, Russia's political
environment is exactly what these groups need for success
.
53Erlanger, "In Kremlin," Sec. A, p. 5.
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V. ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENTAL ANALYSIS
Russia's economic environment is in extremely poor
condition as well, and holds little promise of rebounding
anytime soon. Russia's economic environment is deficient in
the areas of fiscal responsibility, productivity, institution
building, and privatization. Although President Yeltsin,
Yegor Gaidar, and Boris Federov began to institute reforms in
these areas at the beginning of 1992, they were far from
successful. The actions of the Russian Central Bank Chairman,
Viktor Geraschenko, and other anti- reformers, managed to block
their reform efforts. As a result, one can speculate that
since the attempted reforms only went half way, they may have
hurt more than helped. It should be understood however, that
Russia's economic troubles originated in the Soviet period,
and the country's economy has been in a downward spiral for a
number of years. Moreover, for the nearly one year that
reform programs went more or less unimpeded, the economy
showed definite signs of improvement. 54 Therefore, the reform
process only plays a minor role in causing the currently poor
state of the Russian economy. One thing is certain though,
the deteriorated state of Russia's economic environment has
provided many opportunities for organized crime groups.
54
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A. FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY
With regard to fiscal responsibility, the Central Bank's
continuing subsidization of the large and grossly inefficient
state-run enterprises is considered to be Russia's greatest
economic problem. 55 This is because the Central Bank is
having to print rubles in order to pay for the soft -budget
constraints they are allowing these enterprises to maintain.
In other words, when the expenditures of a state enterprise
exceeds its established budget, the Central Bank extends the
enterprise a line of credit to cover the overage. Since these
credits are unlikely to be paid back, the Central Bank has to
print more rubles to cover their own losses. The resulting
massive injection of rubles into the economy thus causes
inflation and large budget deficits. The effects of these
practices are summed up nicely by Geraschenko' s statement
that, "the Russian government would have difficulty keeping
its 1994 deficit below two or three times the 1993 level, when
inflation was 900 percent." 56 Right now, the inflation rate
is averaging 20 percent a month. 57 As for the exchange rate,
55The World Bank, Russian Economic Reform: Crossing the
Threshold of Structural Chancre
.
(Washington, D.C.: The
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World
Bank, 1992), pp. 105-106.
56Samuel Brit tan, "Post -communism: the rival models, " Financial
Times, 24 February 1994, p. 20.
""More shock, more therapy," Financial Times . 7 January 1994,
p. 15.
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it is approximately 1600 rubles per dollar. 58 Given all of
the negative effects of these inflationary practices, it is
hard to believe that they are being continued. Nonetheless,
if Russia's goal is maintaining employment, as opposed to
stabilizing their currency, then these practices will continue
despite the fact that it is only a short term solution.
Organized crime groups have been able to take advantage of
Russia's fiscal "irresponsibility" in several ways. One of
the ways organized crime groups can use the deficient
centralized banking system is to receive low interest loans
from the Central Bank, allegedly for the maintenance of an
enterprise they may have acquired through privatization. But
instead of using the money for the stated purpose, it is
placed into a commercial bank, owned or operated by the
organized crime group, for re -lending at much higher interest
rates. 59 Another way organized crime groups profit through
the banking system is to bribe bank officials into giving low
interest three -month credits that are never repaid. 60 Banks
are also being used by criminal enterprises to launder the
money they make in other illegal ventures. The money can then
be used for more legitimate business activities such as
58
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purchasing privatization vouchers; thus initiating the
scenario described above all over again.
Concerning the inflation caused by the irresponsible
practices of the Central Bank, organized crime groups benefit
from it too. The weakening of the ruble by inflationary
practices deteriorates the buying power of Russia's citizens.
Consequently, the need to survive makes these citizens easy
targets for persuasion by organized crime groups to steal
strategic raw materials. For this reason, the Ministry of
Internal Affairs has cited inflation as one of the two main
causes for the doubling in cases of theft and smuggling of
strategic raw materials between 1992 and 1993. 61
B . PRODUCTIVITY
Productivity is also declining in Russia. Industrial
output has slipped to about 50 percent of 1989 levels. 62
There are several reasons for the decline. When inflation is
high and consequently causes prices to rise, there is an
inability and/or unwillingness to replace equipment in
factories. This translates into a lack of productive
investment. Instead, money is invested into speculative
ventures such as real estate and currency speculation where
inflation can be an advantage. In addition, when factory
61
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Journal, 1 March 1994, Sec. A, p. 10, col. 1.
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mangers and workers are on low fixed incomes, they have little
incentive to become more efficient and increase production.
After all, if the enterprise does not meet its budget, it can
always turn to the "benevolent" Central Bank for more
subsidies. For organized crime groups, low productivity gives
them the justification to strip and sell off an inefficient
enterprise, and pocket the earnings. They can also take




A related matter is the problem of trying to convert the
enterprises of the military- industrial complex to civilian
use. Russia inherited approximately 60-70 percent of the
former Soviet military- industrial complex, encompassing more
than 1,700 enterprises and organizations. 63 For the most
part, these enterprises are inefficient and unprofitable.
Yet, they cannot simply be re- tooled for the production of
other more profitable items. In order to carry out the
conversion program for 1992, these enterprises estimated that
they would need credits of over 100 billion rubles. 64 As
63
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shown above, subsidies that large would surely send inflation
through the roof. The World Bank's recommendation for solving
the problem would be to shut these enterprises down. 65 While
Gaidar was around, he seemed to be aware of this and was
taking action through his monetary and fiscal reforms.
Unfortunately, the prospect of mass unemployment and
industrial collapse is more than the people of Russia are
willing to take. The former Soviet policy of full employment,
no matter how unproductive, has been a great source of
security for Russia's workers. 66 When approximately 80 to 85
percent of Russia's labor force is employed in urban
industrial activities, any move to eliminate jobs in this
sector is bound to be a cause for alarm. 67 Not to mention,
rapid investment from private sources into the creation of new
businesses, which would in turn create new jobs, is highly
unlikely. Matters are compounded even further by the fact
that mass housing shortages prevent low paid, or unemployed
workers, from moving to find new jobs. 68 This contributes to
the creation of severe regional problems as many communities
that are centered around one particular industry face the
65The World Bank, p. 105
66Sergei Zhdakayev, "A Job No Longer Lasts Forever: The
Unemployment Crisis," World Press Review , November 1992, p. 11.
"Marshall I. Goldman, "The Chinese Model: The Solution to
Russia's Economic Ills?" Current History . October 1993, p. 321.
68„ The Qreat Russian Depression Of 1992?" Business Week , 20
April 1992, p. 47.
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threat of unemployment. In the end, these problems give
people like Chernomyrdin and Geraschenko an opportunity to
assert their authority and curb the pace of the conversion
program and continue subsidizing inefficient producers. 69
On the other hand, the problems with conversion present a
convenient situation for organized crime groups. For one
thing, the failure to convert inefficient enterprises further
hampers the overall reform process and thereby increases the
feelings of security by criminal enterprises. It is also
conceivable that the surplus weapons being produced in these
inefficient enterprises of the military industrial complex
could be sold to organized crime groups for future sale on the
international black market. This is because organized crime
groups may be the only outlet that these inefficient factories
have for their particular wares. Some degree of credence is
given to this idea when estimates show a decline in Russia's
weapons exports from $6 billion in 1991 to $2.5 billion in
1992. 70
D. INSTITUTION BUILDING
Another reason for Russia's economic floundering is their
inability to develop and build capitalist institutions.
Russia is still depending on the legal framework established
69
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by Soviet laws, and is missing a body of civil law that would
regulate the economic relationships necessary for a free-
market economy. 71
The legal infrastructure covering financial contracts,
property rights, bankruptcy, the organization and
powers of banks and other financial intermediaries,
and other financial regulations need to be redrafted
and with more difficulty, enforced. 72
To say that the current legislation in the economic
environment lacks clarity would be a bit of an understatement.
With regard to "murky" property rights, although the
government recognizes private property, it is unclear who owns
former state property or whether it can be resold. And the
absence of clearly defined ownership has had a negative effect
on the amount of badly needed investment from the West
.
According to one Russian businessman, "without 100%
guarantees, they won't invest $1,000. It must be something
about the Western psyche." 73
The banking system is also in disarray. It lacks proper
systems of accounting, auditing, and financial disclosure. In
addition, there are not enough trained auditors, accountants
and financial specialists to produce reliable information on
enterprises and other financial institutions. "This lack of
71The World Bank, p. 75.
72Ibid., p. 113.
73Ignatius, Sec. A, p. 10, col. 1
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information makes it difficult to evaluate the quality of
banks and enterprises, thereby exacerbating the already high
level of risks facing potential investors and depositors." 74
The Central Bank has all of the above problems, in addition
to problems of supervision and control of the other banks in
Russia. Since the Central Bank has no auditing capacity to
track the money that it lends, their only recourse against
losses is to cut off credits. Yet, as stated previously, this
is an unlikely course of action since the political pressures
against this are apparently too great. 75
The state of Russia's banking system also creates
opportunities for organized crime groups. Due to the
inadequate design and regulation of this system, organized
crime groups find it very easy to infiltrate and take
advantage of it. As a matter of fact, organized crime groups




Another institution building difficulty stems from a poor
tax collection system, which subsequently leads to an
inadequate social safety net. In Russia, corporate taxes,
federal and local, can reach 80 percent. 77 This does not even
include such things as customs duties on exports. As a
74The World Bank, p. 112.
75Corwin, Possehl, Stanglin, and Trimble, p. 41.
76
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result, tax evasion is a common practice among businessmen and
organized crime groups who in no way want to relinquish their
profits to the state. Besides increasing Russia's deficit, it
also keeps the government from creating an adequate social
safety net; namely unemployment compensation. And as Gaidar
discovered, without unemployment compensation, there is little
chance of radical reform.
E. PRIVATIZATION
The privatization program is considered by some to be one
of Russia's few success stories. Part of Gaidar's original
reform program, privatization was supposed to involve the mass
sale of Russia's state-owned enterprises. In all,
approximately 60,000 small businesses and 6,000 large state
enterprises were to be sold. 78
Under mass privatization, the shares of these
companies will be privatized in several blocks. Some
shares will be distributed either for free or at
deeply discounted prices to workers and managers; some
shares will be auctioned to the public through
vouchers; and some shares will be sold in cash
auctions . 79
78
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Nevertheless, this program has not run as smoothly as
hoped. To begin with, only about 31 percent of the designated
enterprises have been privatized. 80 And in some cases, the
state only privatized parts of an enterprise, thereby allowing
it to continue receiving subsidies when needed. 81 Moreover,
corrupt individuals and organized crime groups have relatively
easy access to the purchase of these enterprises and firms
since there is usually little time to check the bidders'
documents or the source of their funding. 82 There is also
little to keep industrial managers from selling off the assets
of a privatized company thereby defeating the purpose of the
sale in the first place. 83
Privatization has also led to the problem of capital
flight and the continual loss of Russia's natural resources.
This is accomplished when natural resources (ie., oil,
aluminum, copper, titanium, lead, cobalt, nickel, lumber,
etc.) are bought for rubles at "give-away" prices in Russia
and sold for hard currency at "dumping" prices abroad. But
instead of the huge profits coming back to the Russian
economy, they are kept abroad in offshore accounts like the
80Corwin, Possehl, Stanglin, and Trimble, p. 40.
81Anne Imse, "Russia's Wild Capitalists Take Aluminum for a
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Cayman Islands or Bahamas. 84 According to Russian economist
Nikolai Petrakov, approximately $15 billion (of Russia's $48
billion in export revenues 85 ) was siphoned out of the economy
by these activities in 1993. M Finally, much emphasis has
been placed on sustaining and then privatizing state
enterprises, although it is not nearly as effective as
encouraging brand-new businesses to develop. 87
The privatization program may be one of Russia's most
successful reform programs, but it is also one of the biggest
areas where reform and organized crime overlap.
More generally, the onset of privatization of state
property, the bulk of the nation's material wealth,
released a free-for-all struggle to grab it up, a
struggle in which corrupt, criminal and violent
methods are not being overlooked, to put it mildly.
In this arena the mafia has a double advantage. It
commands strong-arm methods like no one else. And, in
a country in which inflation has wiped out a great
deal of liquid savings, the mafia is widely believed
to have accumulated large material wealth (say in
foreign currency) to bid for the privatized assets in
a proper business like manner. 88
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Not to mention, since bidders, their documents, or the source
of their funding, cannot be thoroughly evaluated, little is
being done to prevent organized crime groups from acquiring
privatized industries and businesses.
Although not directly related to organized crime, the
problems encountered in the attempted privatization of the
Gorky Automobile Factory (GAZ) exemplify the ease at which
organized crime groups can acquire an industry. In this
situation, GAZ management used over $23.9 million in state
subsidies, that were supposed to be used for developing
engines, to buy privatization vouchers on the open market.
These vouchers were then used by approximately 15 front
companies to purchase GAZ stock. The goal in these illegal
activities was to preclude outside investment. This is a
problem because when organized crime groups acquire an
industry or enterprise, it essentially goes from being a state
owned monopoly to a monopoly owned and run by organized crime
groups. The organized crime groups can then effectively fix
prices and manipulate supplies. 89
In addition, when organized crime groups get their hands
on an industry and its resources, the door has been opened for
even more illegal activities. For instance, organized crime
groups can easily smuggle weapons, strategic materials and
other natural resources out of the country. This is
89Celestine Bohlen, "Yeltsin Warning Those Who Obstruct
Reforms," The New York Times . 17 January 1992, Sec. A, p. 10, col.
1.
40
facilitated by a rampant amount of bribing of public
officials, virtually transparent borders, and incredibly poor
export controls.
These types of activities are by no means limited to
privatized industries and enterprises. Through corrupt public
officials, industry employees and military personnel,
organized crime groups have an increased ability to acquire
items from state-owned industries, enterprises or military
installations. Items that will eventually be sold on the
black market. The fact that many of these people are under
paid and desperately in need of money just makes organized
crime groups' work that much easier. As indicated earlier,
this looks to be the predominant method for organized crime
groups to acquire strategic and nuclear materials.
Yet, the reason why the privatization process sees a lot
of organized crime activity is mainly because it is an inroad
for organized crime groups to infiltrate legitimate
businesses. Ownership also tends to eliminate many of the
obstacles that were previously in the way of their illegal
activities. To get an idea of the extent of the organized
crime problem in this area, the Ministry of Internal Affairs
estimates that over 40,000 state and private businesses are
under the control of organized crime groups. 90
90Celestine Bohlen, "Graft and Gangsterism in Russia Blight the
Entrepreneurial Spirit," The New York Times
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VI. STATE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT
For purposes of this thesis, the state security
environment in Russia will encompass the law enforcement,
court and prison systems, legal code, import/export control
apparatus, and those involved in the physical security of
state property.
The integrity of the state security environment has
dramatically deteriorated since the collapse of communism.
The rise in all forms of crime, especially its more organized
versions, have met with little opposition from the various
components of the state security environment. Accordingly,
these components have proven to be less than adequate in
meeting the challenges that crime presents. The biggest
deficiencies can be found in the areas of law enforcement,
laws, the court system, prisons, physical security of state
property, and import/export control. In addition, the large
degree of political interference and corruption that
transpires throughout the state security environment only




Largely due to the poor state of Russia's economy, there
is a lack of money to fund law enforcement and their anti-
42
crime initiatives. 91 As a result, Russia's law enforcement
personnel find themselves ill -equipped to do their jobs. They
lack basic necessities such as patrol cars, weapons,
computers, communication devices, and even gasoline. 92 What
little equipment law enforcement does possess, does not
compare to the resources at the disposal of organized crime
groups. Their resources are more likely to include




Lack of funding has also led to a largely untrained police
force. For instance, recruits are being accepted without
undergoing proper screening, and are not being trained in up-
to-date investigative techniques. 94 With regard to Chechen
organized crime groups, law enforcement's lack of language
trained personnel keeps them from infiltrating groups that
speak different languages. 95 Given the wide variety of ethnic
91Justin Burke, "Russia Launches a 'War on Crime,'" The
Christian Science Monitor . 10 May 1993, p. 12.
92
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groups in Russia, this is undoubtedly a common problem in
fighting organized crime. Not to mention, poor training helps
explain why law enforcement has not yet acquired "a deeper
appreciation of the complex nature of the genuine 'rule-of-law
state.'" 96 The ultimate result is that their ability to fight
the rise in organized crime has been severely undermined.
Lack of money has also meant low wages for law enforcement
personnel. As a result, many agencies are finding themselves
under-manned. The Ministry of Internal Affairs, which is
generally considered Russia's regular police force, was down
by approximately 8,000 officers in the first part of 1993.
"
In Moscow alone there are tens of thousands of vacant law
enforcement positions. Furthermore, low pay and low prestige
are likely to keep these positions vacant into the future. 98
Contributing to the problem of manning the law enforcement
agencies is the rise of private security firms. The financial
success of these firms stems mainly from the feelings of
insecurity by the citizens of Russia. Consequently these
firms are drawing some of the best performers away from
traditional law-enforcement jobs; presumably because they can
96Mark Galeotti, "Perestroika, Perestrelka, Pereborka: Policing
Russia in a Time of Change, " Europe-Asia Studies . Volume 45, Number
5, 1993, p. 783.
97Burke, p. 12.
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offer higher wages and greater prestige." Moreover, the
mission of private security firms focusses primarily on body
guard activities and resource protection. As a result, they
provide little assistance in eliminating organized crime
groups. Nevertheless, efforts are being made to coordinate
the activities of private security firms and official law
enforcement agencies. 100
Other factors have also hampered the efforts of law
enforcement. Since organized crime groups frequently commit
crimes across borders, or flee to other countries once a crime
is committed, law enforcement has had to deal with the
problems of federal to local communication and other multi-
jurisdictional situations. 101 For example, it took the threat
of road blocks on all highways going in and out of Kazakhstan
before the Khazakh police would agree to extradite a
"professional hired killer" back to Russia. 102 Until adequate
measures for such things as investigating multi- jurisdictional
crimes and extraditing criminals can be arranged, it is
"Grieg, pp. 117-118.
100
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obvious that organized crime groups will have the upper hand
in these situations.
In addition, law enforcement is also hindered by a
distrusting society with negative feelings of law
enforcement's past association with the repressive Communist
regime. 103 Because of this, citizens are not likely to report
a crime they have witnessed. It has gotten to the point that
organized crime groups can commit murder in front of dozens of
witnesses without fear of being identified, because nobody
will come forward to give the police a description. 104
Finally, for efficiency, and as a result of political reasons,
various law enforcement entities have had to cope with several
confusing organizational changes over the past few years;
changes that invariably take time to adjust to and delay their
work. 105
B. LAWS
When the FSU collapsed, Russia inherited a body of civil
and criminal legal codes that were highly outdated, ambiguous
and ill-defined, insufficient and ineffectual for today's
purposes. Unfortunately, Russia still has yet to develop a
stable legal framework encompassing either legal recourse or
103Grieg, p. 117.




due process of law. 106 Instead there is a vast array of legal
"loopholes" which give organized crime groups ample
opportunity to avoid prosecution. For instance, "there are no
laws against money laundering, fraud or organized crime on the
books." 107 There is also no Russian equivalent to American
conspiracy laws, and no laws against conflict of interest. 108
Russia is also missing anything resembling the American's
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)
.
Along these same lines, Russia's criminal code only holds
individuals, not organizations, culpable for criminal
activities. Not to mention, bribery is still a largely ill-
defined term. 109 Basically, the legal code cannot handle the
demands being placed on it by rising levels of organized
crime.
This lack of a legal base to fight organized crime is a
situation that resembles what occurred in the United States
prior to the 1950s. Although the organized crime problem in
Russia is probably worse than it ever was in America, the
lesson to be learned is that Russia needs to undertake an
evolution of its legal codes just like the United States did.
One step in this direction is being made by the Commonwealth
106The World Bank, p. 75.
107Elliot and Elliot, p. 30.
108Clines, "Soviets Find," Sec. A, p. 14, col. 1; and Corwin,
Possehl, Stanglin and Trimble, p. 40.
109Burke, p. 12.
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of Independent States with its signing of the Convention on
Legal Aid and Legal Arrangements in Civil, Family, and
Criminal Cases. Nevertheless, the Convention has yet to be
ratified by the new Russian Parliament. 110
C. COURT SYSTEM
Russia also seems to be afflicted with a poorly
functioning court system. According to a study done by the
World Bank, Russia needs to develop an independent judiciary
capable of legal enforcement. 111 This system is also at the
mercy of inadequate legal codes as discussed above. Like
their law enforcement counterparts, prosecutors and judges are
also under paid and overburdened with cases. In some
instances, prosecutors will not open cases because they are
heavily pressed for time. 112 Compounding matters is the
absence of a witness protection program for those testifying
in cases or acting as government informants. 113 Finally,
there is a shortage of jurors and other court personnel.
According to the chairman of the Tyumen oblast court,
nonBureau To pight cis Organized Crime Opens in Moscow, " from
ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, in Daily Report Central Eurasia . FBIS-SOV-94-
009, 13 January 1994, p. 3.
ulThe World Bank, p. 75.
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Neva," Newsweek , 12 October 1992, p. 52.
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People do not want to serve on juries. By law, their
place of employment pays them the average wage for the
time they spend in court, and who wants that? There
are not enough auxiliary personnel in the courts, no
process servers, no gasoline, no vehicles or guards to
bring criminals to court, etc." 4
For organized crime groups, the fact that Russia lacks a
functioning court system further mitigates the risk of being
prosecuted for an offense. Since the dramatic increase in
crime has overburdened the system, it is highly likely that
cases will be dropped for lack of time. Members of organized
crime groups can also avoid prosecution by bribing government
officials to intervene on their behalf and get cases
dismissed. Moreover, in the absence of a witness protection
program, organized crime groups have a better chance of
eliminating witnesses against them; thereby getting cases
dropped for lack of evidence.
D . PRISONS
Russia's prison system is clearly in a state of disarray.
One account of the condition of Russia's prison system holds
that it has been literally "squeezed between dwindling funds
and a rising crime rate." 115 Because of this, prisons have
become glaringly over- crowded, thus facilitating more inmate
114
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115Fred Hiatt, "Russia fears uprisings in 'the zone' as
penitentiary abuses roil inmates," The Star Ledger . 26 September
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49
disturbances and escape attempts. Russian minister of
internal affairs, Viktor Yerin, estimates Russia's inmate
population at approximately 500,000 in correctional
institutions, and 300,000 in preliminary investigation
facilities (jails). 116 As a result of overcrowded
facilities, Mr. Yerin further stated that approximately ten
percent of the inmate population is scheduled for amnesty.
This group will include elderly people, juveniles, and first
time offenders who do not appear to represent an "undue social
threat." 117 Besides the problems being caused by
overcrowding, there is also a shortage of staff to run the
prison system. It has reached the point where prison
officials are now being allowed to put the prisons to
commercial use. There is fear however, that this "will only
provide a pretext for officials to enrich themselves while
exploiting prisoners." 118
In sum, the state of the prison system reduces the chances
that a convicted member of an organized crime group will
receive any kind of meaningful and lasting punishment. And
for those sent to prison, chances of escape have definitely
increased. This is a direct result of prison overcrowding and
limited amounts of guards to oversee the inmate population.
11611 Internal Affairs Minister on Crime, Police, " from ARGUMENTY





Furthermore, the notion of prisons being put to commercial
uses raises questions of prison officials using their new-
found authority to exploit prisoners for personal gain. Along
these same lines, what is to stop these officials from
accepting bribes in return for the release of a criminal?
Fines instead of prison sentences could be imposed on a
convicted organized crime group member, but he is probably in
the best position to pay it anyway. Besides, he would be
released into society just to commit more crimes.
E. PHYSICAL SECURITY OF STATE PROPERTY
The physical security formerly afforded to state property,
namely conventional weapons and nuclear materials, has been
weakened under the strain of economic pressures and
mismanagement. A strong indicator of this is that military
installations and depots, which typically house conventional
weaponry, have been subject to increasing amounts of thefts.
Based on statements from the Russian Defense Ministry, 6,430
cases of weapons theft from military depots occurred in 1993;
up from 3,923 cases the year before. The thefts included such
items as tanks, rocket launchers and Kalashnikov assault
rifles. 119
More alarming though, is the illicit trade in nuclear
materials which has also emerged. According to Germany's
119Brian Duffy and Jeff Trimble, "The Wise Guys Of Russia, " U.S
News & World Report , 7 March 1994, p. 46.
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foreign intelligence service, organized crime groups from
Russia were involved in the sale of nuclear -bomb -making
materials like enriched uranium and cesium- 137. Additionally,
materials such as these were reportedly stolen from a Russian
Navy storage depot in Murmansk. 120 Thefts and illicit sales
of this nature lend further credence to the idea that physical
security of state property has deteriorated.
Some of the reasons being cited for debilitated physical
security and the resulting thefts have ranged from low or
unpaid wages, to mismanagement and a lack of functioning
controls on weapons and material stockpiles. Reasons such as
these appear to hold merit when Russian soldiers have resorted
to selling their Kalashnikov assault rifles on the black
market. 121 Or when as a result of unpaid wages, the Russian
Federal Nuclear Center adopts a resolution addressed to
President Yeltsin which says:
If this critical situation continues, the Federal
Nuclear Center will be forced to discontinue work on
state programs, including those connected with
international treaties on control, destruction and
non-proliferation of nuclear armaments, and those on
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These circumstances create great opportunities for organized
crime groups. If military personnel and workers in the
military industrial complex have not been paid or cannot live
on their meager wages, they may then be easily induced to
steal weapons or sensitive materials on behalf of organized
crime groups
.
Finally, Vitaly Shlikov, an advisor to Russia's Defense
Ministry, has stated that Russia's government is not even
aware of what their actual weapons stocks and reserves are. 123
This further weakens the amount of security around these
weapons. If accurate inventory controls are not available,
how will anyone be able to tell if something has been stolen?
Therefore, if an organized crime group is not caught in the
act of acquiring weapons or sensitive materials, the chances
of the crime ever being detected are pretty slim.
F. IMPORT/EXPORT CONTROL
One of the biggest criticisms of the state security
environment has been the manifestation of "porous" borders
around Russia and the inability to institute better
import/export controls. When the Soviet Union collapsed,
Russia was left with approximately 8,400 miles of unprotected
frontier. 124 Therefore, smuggling by organized crime
groups in and out of the country became much easier as the
123Cole and Lubman, Sec. A, p. 4, col. 1.
124Corwin, Possehl, Stanglin and Trimble, p. 38
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chronic problems associated with seemingly "transparent"
borders decreased the odds that organized crime activities
would be detected.
Illegal cargoes include such things as weapons, strategic
and nuclear materials, narcotics, people, and money. In fact,
smuggling in all of its forms has been so prevalent that when
Russia's customs services increased their manpower from
approximately 8,000 to 31,000, there was little resulting
difference in the amount of illegal activity. 125 In addition,
the continued use of export licenses, excessive regulations,
and heavy customs duties on import/export activity, encourages
the bribing of state officials to "let things slide." And
once organized crime groups have these corrupt officials "in
their pocket," they worry very little about being caught.
The methods used in smuggling are as diverse as the items
being smuggled. One method is the use of forged documents
such as bogus end-user certificates and passports. Other
methods involve disguising the smuggled item. For example,
when a shipment of faucets was stopped while leaving Russia,
it was discovered that they were made of solid nicke 126
With regard to oil, trainloads of this strategic material
regularly disappear with the help of "insiders", only to turn
up on Russia's black market or in another country. 127
125Ibid., p. 41
126Ibid., p. 3 6
127Ibid., pp. 3 8 and 40.
54
Fortunately, some progress towards finding a solution to
Russia's import/export problems is just now being made. As of
1 March 1994, Russia's customs service finally began tracking
all exports. It will be some time before the effects of this
measure can be seen. It is important to note however, that
organized crime groups in Russia have been adept at smuggling
for decades. Moreover, many of the networks and connections
they use for illicit trade are just as old and are very well
established. The difference lays in the types of items that
are being smuggled. Not to mention, organized crime groups in
Russia are doing extremely well in forging new networks and
connections all over the world. Whatever the case, Russia has
a long way to go in handling its import/export problems and
firming up its borders.
G. POLITICAL INTERFERENCE
Complicating the numerous problems being experienced by
the state security environment and its fight against organized
crime groups, is interference from Russia's political elites.
As mentioned earlier, various agencies within this environment
have been forced to undergo re -organizations, cutbacks and
mission changes. One of the latest victims has been the
Ministry of Security. This last remnant of the KGB was
abolished by President Yeltsin at the end of 1993. 128




but because they failed to warn Yeltsin about the coup attempt
in October 1993 or come to his aid while it was occurring. 129
Consequently, the investigative and anti- corruption branches
of the Ministry of Security have now been bestowed upon the
Ministry of Internal Affairs. 130 Changes such as these slow
the progress of various agencies in fighting organized crime.
This is because they are forced to re -organize, re -group and
handle internal matters instead of concentrating on their real
work.
Another problem is that organizations created to combat
crime and corruption have been used to accomplish political
agendas. An obvious example of this was former Vice President
Aleksandr Rutskoi's misuse of the Commission for the Fight
Against Crime and Corruption. Created in October 1992 by
President Yeltsin, Rutskoi used his position as head of the
Commission in an attempt to discredit other political
elites. 131 In the end, Rutskoi discredited himself more than
anyone, and led to the Commission's inability to accomplish
its mission.
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H. CORRUPTION
Corruption has taken its toll on the integrity of the
state security environment too. Mostly due to low pay and low
prestige, corruption has become an all too common phenomenon
in Russia, engulfing all segments of the state security
community. In 1992, over 2,000 crimes were blamed on
policemen. 132 Most reports indicate however, that statistics
like these merely represent the "tip of the iceberg." In St.
Petersburg, estimates put police corruption at about 70% of
the entire force. 133 A "top-level Government report" stated
that police officers in Tver tip-off "local gangs" when
valuable cargo passes through the town. 134 The conditions are
so bad that in fact, "traffic police officers constantly pull
drivers over to extract "fines" for imagined infractions." 135
The military has not been immune from corruption either.
Military personnel have been caught trying to sell assorted
types of conventional weapons and strategic metals. In early
1993, Defense Minister Pavel Grachev said, in a television
address, that 3,000 officers had been reprimanded for engaging
in questionable business practices, and 46 generals and other
132
"Crime in Russia," p. 58.
133Elliott, p. 50.
134Bohlen, "Graft and Gangsterism," Sec. A, p. 1, col. 1.
135Howard Witt, "Russia's Organized Crime Problems Spin Out of
Control for the Police," The Journal Of Commerce . 10 August 1993,
Sec. A, p. 5, col. 1.
57
officers were facing criminal charges. 136 Moreover, in June
1993, officers from Russia's Northern Fleet were caught trying
to sell 300 kg of technical -grade silver. At the time, the
silver was valued at approximately 180 million rubles. 137
Furthermore, it is not unreasonable to assume that organized
crime groups are in a great position to take advantage of
these corrupt practices.
Still more alarming, former members of the state security
environment (police, KGB, military) are actually joining
organized crime groups. They now "ply their former trades for
private gain rather than on behalf of the state." 138 By
giving organized crime groups the benefits of their knowledge
and training, they can be a big help in circumventing the
efforts of the state security apparatus.
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VII. SOCIAL ENVIRONMENTAL ANALYSIS
In addition to the chaotic political, economic, and
security conditions, Russia's social environment is highly
problematic and hardly conducive to the further development of
democracy and a free -market economy. The causes of this
situation result from a combination of over 70 years of
communist rule and the country's current geopolitical
problems. Because of this, society has become demoralized and
remains fearful of the reappearance of an authoritarian
system. Unfortunately, these two attributes of society add to
the plight of Russia's struggling reform efforts.
The social environment in Russia is characterized by a
demoralized people. Russia's citizens took great pride in the
great -power status of the FSU. Now that it is gone, they
yearn for its return. 139 They especially miss the imperial
status that Russia had exercised as a part of the FSU. For
Russians, learning to accept that they are no longer seen as
"big brother" to the other republics has been tough. In
addition, the people of Russia are used to living under an
authoritarian system that, despite its many shortcomings, gave
the appearance crime was under control. Now that society has
emerged from authoritarianism, crime has soared; thus leaving
139Steven Erlanger, "Men, Mostly Nervous, Voted For Russian
Right, Poll Says," The New York Times . 30 December 1993, Sec. A, p.
10, col. 1.
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society with a sense of lawlessness and despair. In other
words, during the Soviet period the people had no law, but
they did have order. With the end of the FSU, they now have
neither law nor order. 140
Yet, the state's efforts in trying to establish a society
governed by the rule of law are being hampered by the people's
fear of authoritarianism and decline in morality. As a sad
consequence of communist rule, there is a distrust of the
country's politicians, police, and military. Not to mention,
the culture of Soviet society has been marked by 70 years of
trying to "get around" the system. What this means is that
people in the FSU have been more willing in the past to engage
in illegal activities in order to survive. An example of this
is their frequent use of the black market to obtain consumer
goods during the Soviet period. Unfortunately, this decline
in morality is also impacting efforts to combat organized
crime today. People are once again in a position where their
livelihood is being threatened. And as in the past, these
people will do what they think is necessary to survive; even
it means breaking the law.
Ironically, when the economy is in shambles and organized
crime is rampant, strong leadership and an equally strong
police force may be a big help. Yet, Russia has been slow to
adopt the necessary measures to combat the rise in organized
140Interview with Gabriele M. Rockwell, intelligence analyst,
Drug Enforcement Agency, by David M. Lowy, 17 December 1993.
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crime for fear that it may appear oppressive to the people.
Viktor Yerin, Russian minister of internal affairs believes
that, "bringing the military into the streets is always
politically damaging for us (the MVD)." 141 For example, when
the Ministry of the Interior first tried to form joint street
patrols of police and army units to fight crime, it was
criticized as "a step toward the reintroduction of the
totalitarian system. " 142
Consequently, continuing activities of organized crime
groups have met with little resistance. This demonstrates
that backing too far off of authoritarian measures, "before
the certainties of a law-abiding society have emerged to take
their place," can have a terribly negative effect. 143 In
essence, Russian society's tremendous sense of lawlessness and
fear of authoritarianism creates a dangerous mixture. People
have a desire for law and order, but seem unwilling to give
the authorities the powers they need to combat the cause of
the problem. Therefore, when the problem (crime) goes
unchecked, they lose what little faith in the police they have
and their sense of lawlessness increases. According to a
141
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report by Russian economist Pyotr Filippov, when lawlessness
meets no resistance:
An entire generation is growing up for whom this
situation is normal and who in such circumstances will
not turn to official authorities, but to unofficial
ones. These people are more likely to hire a murderer
to punish a guilty or even an unpleasant partner than
to go to court or arbitration.
Ultimately, the demoralization from Russia's loss of
empire and mounting crime have left society angry and
suffering from anxiety over their future and the future of
their country. 145 Unfortunately, their solution has been to
elect Vladimir Zhirinovsky, whose campaign was "deliberately
pitched" to win the support of these people. 146 According to
Yuri A. Levada, director of the All-Russian Center for Public
Opinion an Market Research, "a vote for Zhirinovsky was the
most dramatic protest available. In a way, he seemed to be
the only truly anti- establishment figure." 147 It also
indicates that Russian society is still very immature, as they
are evidently easily seduced by promises of easy solutions to
144
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complex problems. 148 Yet, the old saying applies, "be careful
what you ask for, you might just get it." "Draconian
solutions to the law-and- order crisis are now part of the
mainstream political thinking and will probably dominate the
agenda of the new State Duma." 149 For instance, Zhirinovsky
has called for measures that would allow the police to carry
out summary executions of organized crime figures. 150
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VIII. WEAPONS AND SENSITIVE MATERIALS MARKETPLACE
So long as regional tensions encourage neighbors
to arm against each other, the demand for more and
deadlier weapons will continue. And so long as the
money is there in large enough quantities, ways will
always be found around the restrictions that




Because of the deteriorated state of Russia's political,
economic, state security, and social environments, organized
crime groups in Russia are now engaging in the illicit sale of
weapons, weapons components, strategic and nuclear materials,
and technologies with military applications. The items that
have been sold in these categories range from ammunition,
high-powered handguns, kalashnikov assault rifles, rocket
launchers, missile systems, and tanks, all the way to
strategic materials such as nickel, aluminum, and oil as well
as nuclear materials like cesium- 137, and high and low
enriched uranium. This is just a partial list of the items
being sold by organized crime groups. In essence, the only
thing that has limited what organized crime groups in Russia
have sold, is what they did not have an opportunity to
acquire, or the risk involved was not justified by the
potential benefits to be gained.
151l,The Covert Arms Trade: The second-oldest profession," The
Economist
. 12 February 1994, p. 23.
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Based on the economic theory of organized crime, organized
crime groups would not be going through the trouble of
assessing the opportunities and risks of illicitly selling
weapons and sensitive materials unless there was a viable
market and some potential for big profits. After all,
maximization of profit is the primary goal of these groups.
Fortunately for them, there is in fact plenty of demand and
huge profits to be made by selling Russia's sundry inventory
of items with military applications.
It must be taken into account however, that there has
always been a large demand for products of the Soviet military
industrial complex. Moreover, following the collapse of the
FSU in 1991, 60 to 70 percent of this highly lucrative market
fell into Russia's hands, as did the demand. 152 A partial
list of potential customers in this market today would include
China, India, Iran, and Malaysia. 153 The range of products
these countries are looking for could include anything
Russia's military industrial complex has to offer, but mainly
focusses on larger hi-tech items, whether it be Kilo-class
submarines for the Chinese, or MiG-29Rs for Malaysia. 154 To
be sure, the Russian government is well aware of this fact and
is eagerly attempting to sell these types of arms all over the
world.
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Nonetheless, organized crime groups in Russia have been
able to establish themselves in the weapons and sensitive
materials market too. For them, just about any product from
the military industrial complex is a potential money maker.
Wherever there is a conventional arms embargo for example,
there is a lucrative market for black market sales of big and
small arms. As a result, places like the former Yugoslavia,
Libya, and Iraq have become ideal markets for smugglers. 155
It is estimated that nearly $2 billion-worth of weapons went
into the former Yugoslavia, via "the illegal weapons
pipeline," in 1993. 156 Given the vast degree of networks and
connections of organized crime groups in Russia, it would not
be unreasonable to assume they were among the smugglers that
exploited (and still exploit) this market. Moreover, Russia
complains that it lost approximately $7.5 billion in
"legitimate" arms sales since it began to comply with
international arms embargoes. 157 Since Russia's organized
crime groups would have little scruples about selling to
places that other countr 3 and their own government have
restricted, they are most iiKely helping to fill the void.
There are other potential "customers" for organized crime
groups who are looking for weapons, weapons components,
155
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strategic and nuclear materials, and technologies with
military applications. Terrorist groups would be interested
in many of these items. Moreover, if a terrorist group had a
state sponsor (Libya comes to mind) , they would be in a good
position to afford high black market prices. Drug
traffickers, in need of assault rifles, handguns or grenades,
would also make good customers of Russia's organized crime
groups. 158 Lastly, any country that wanted to discreetly
build up its weapons program, conventional or nuclear, would
be interested in seeking out organized crime groups in Russia
as a potential source. Countries like Iraq and North Korea
seem to fit into this particular category.
As exemplified by the above examples, the illicit sale of
weapons and sensitive materials is a big business for
organized crime groups in Russia today. This would probably
explain the 40.7% increase in thefts of conventional weapons
and ammunition in Russia between January 1991 and November
1992. 159 Or the twofold increase in thefts from weapons
depots between 1992 and 1993. 160 As discussed earlier, there
has been a tremendous amount of illicit sales of strategic raw
materials like nickel, oil, and technical grade silver going
158Rockwell.
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on. The illicit sale of nuclear weapons and weapons-grade
nuclear materials is also beginning to occur, but there is
little evidence to suggest that it has become widespread.
There have been reports of isolated incidents of weapons -grade
nuclear materials being stolen though. For example, an
employee of a nuclear fuel research center was caught after
stealing three pounds of highly enriched uranium. 161 On the
other hand, there has been a big rise in thefts of low-grade
nuclear materials and other radioactive sources. Yet, these
thefts have been reportedly carried out by petty thieves and
other uninformed individuals looking to make a quick
profit. 162 Keep in mind though, with inadequate inventory
controls on nuclear materials, only the thefts that are
stopped are most likely to be detected.
Concerning the amount of money to be made on weapons and
sensitive materials, like any other market the laws of supply
and demand apply. For instance, the profit to be made on
items that are in short supply or difficult to smuggle would
be relatively high. Just the opposite is true of items that
are relatively easy to obtain legally, or are in great supply
in the black market. Following this logic, organized crime
groups would not be expected to sell the same things as the
161Jonathan Beaty, "Russia's Yard Sale," Time . 18 Apr 1994, p.
55.
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Russian government to the same customers. With regard to
specific items, the profits to be made on the illicit sale of
nuclear materials would mostly likely exceed the profits to be
made on the illicit sale of conventional weapons. For
example, Germany's foreign intelligence service estimates that
a kilo of chromium- 50 goes for $25,000, a kilo of cesium- 137
for up to $1 million, and a kilo of lithium- 6 for $10
million. 163 Of course dealing in nuclear materials involves
iuch more risk, but given the nature of organized crime
groups, potential profits like these can rationalize the
taking of very big risks.
163Duffy and Trimble, p. 46.
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IX. THREATS TO REGIONAL/INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
Since more and more evidence is coming to light that
organized crime groups are able to obtain and sell a nuclear
warhead or weapons-grade nuclear material, the chances of it
occurring can no longer be considered too remote and should
definitely not be discounted. A possible scenario for this to
occur would begin with a foreign government. The foreign
government could sponsor their intelligence service or a
terrorist group to acquire a nuclear weapon or weapons-grade
material from an organized crime group. The organized crime
group would then bribe or intimidate the appropriate people to
obtain the requested item. Following this "inside job,"
(probably accomplished by an underpaid employee) the organized
crime group would then give the weapon or material to the
intelligence service or terrorist group in return for payment
in cash or possibly narcotics. 16 * While this is occurring,
the organized crime group would have virtually no idea of who
the original sponsor was; nor would they care. The government
sponsor would then be free to use the weapon or material as
they saw fit, with little chance of ever getting caught.
It is very clear from a potential scenario like the one
described above that the illicit sale of weapons, weapons
components, materials and technologies with military
164Rockwell.
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applications can pose several threats to regional and
international security. These threats have manifested
themselves in the following manners: 1) increased instability
caused by the proliferation of nuclear and conventi nal
weapons or the components and technologies needed to develop
them; 2) an inability to accurately track shipments or monitor
inventories; 3) increased environmental hazards and pote-^ial
for nuclear accidents; 4) increased capabilities of terrorist
groups and other "uncontrollable elements;" 5) an exacerbation
of tensions or conflicts in unstable regions of the world; and
6) an undermining of the anti-proliferation efforts of
international organizations.
The first threat to regional and international security is
the destabilizing effect on various global communities caused
by the increased proliferation from illicit weapons sales.
With regard to developing nations and regions, they are
"easily destabilized by weapons build-ups and are far more
likely to develop into war." 165 This is based on the idea
that developing nations are inherently more unstable than
their established counterpai 3. Not to mention, "whole
societies suffer in the form of shattered communities and
opportunities lost when scarce resources are squandered on
wasteful weapons." 166 Yet, the destabilizing effects are not
165Michael Wines, "Third World Seeks Advanced Arms, " The New
York Times . 26 March 1991, Sec. A, p. 12, col. 1.
166Mark Sommer, "Closing the Arms Bazaar, " The Christian Science
Monitor . 27 August 1992, p. 18.
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limited to developing nations. If it is discovered or even
perceived that any country is receiving weapons covertly, then
the resulting insecurity, fear, or panic may cause a
neighboring country to initiate their own weapons build-up.
Given the enormous costs involved in developing conventional
forces, these neighboring countries may choose to proceed with
developing a more cost effective nuclear force. And if they
already have a nuclear program they would be far less likely
to make agreements to reduce or limit its potential. 167
The second threat organized crime groups pose comes from
the inability to track illegal shipments or accurately gauge
and monitor the inventories of their customers. For example,
to determine the types and quantities of weapons that a
country purchases usually relies upon, "intelligence sharing
among supplier states." 168 In other words, one of the major
ways that weapons sales are tracked is that the supplier
country relates to others what it sells. When a country makes
a purchase from organized crime groups however, the covert
nature of the transaction renders this method of tracking
ineffective. Moreover, each time organized crime groups make
a transaction, an unknown customer, receives unknown
merchandise, increasing their weapons potential by an unknown
167Roger Molander, "Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
and Implications for Mediterranean Regional Security, " in
Internazionali Conference on the New Mediterranean Security
Environment




"Curb Deadly High-Tech Trade, " The New York Times . 12 April
1991, Sec. A, p. 28, col. 1.
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amount. Concerning nuclear weapons and weapons -grade nuclear
materials, should speculation that Russia is unaware of what
quantities they actually possess prove to be true, then thefts
of these items and materials by organized crime groups or
their agents would either be undetectable or at the very least
take a considerable amount of time to detect, thus adding to
an already long list of unknowns. 169 This multitude of
"unknowns" contributes to other countries feelings of
insecurity, therefore contributing to the threat of
destabilization discussed above. Use of the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has been suggested as a monitoring
device for the spread of nuclear weapons and materials, but
recent experiences in Iraq and North Korea have raised
questions about the IAEA's ability to accomplish this task. 170
Potential damage to the environment, human life and the
increased risk of a nuclear accident represent the third major
threat from these illicit sales by organized crime groups.
This particular threat involves the illicit sale of nuclear
materials more than anything else. To begin with, it is a
reasonable assumption that organized crime groups are not
particularly adept at handling nuclear materials; hence, they
are probably unaware of the necessary safeguards required in
169
"IZVESTIYA on Thefts of Radioactive Materials From St.
Petersburg Plant, " from Jzvestiya, in Daily Report Central Eurasia ,
FBIS-SOV-92-227, 24 November 1992, pp. 41-42.
170
"Stopping The Next Nuclear Renegade," The New York Times , 15
February 1993, Sec. A, p. 14, col. 1.
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handling, storing and transporting these materials. This lack,
of knowledge has been evidenced by instances in which thieves
have opened up the protective casing surrounding nuclear
materials, inadvertently condemning themselves to death. 171
In addition, there is a good chance that the recipient of the
nuclear materials is also unfamiliar or at least inexperienced
at handling them. In either case, their lack of knowledge is
extremely dangerous to themselves and the environment.
Furthermore, if an organized crime group acquires nuclear
materials, but cannot find a buyer for them, there is nothing
to keep them from dumping the materials in such places as a
back alley, open field or body of water. Besides the obvious
environmental concerns, this would be a great risk to human
life. Even if a buyer can be found, another potential concern
is the increased risk of a nuclear accident resulting from the
recipient country's attempts to develop the newly acquired
material into a weapon. Another concern, is that if the
material is attached to an ordinary high explosive (called a
"dirty bomb"), then the resulting effect would not be a
nuclear explosion but a conventional explosion that spreads
radioactive material over a vast area. For instance, if a
"dirty bomb" was used in the World Trade Center bombing, one
expert speculated that a large part of New York city would
have been showered with nuclear material. 172
171
"IZVESTIYA on Thefts," p. 42.
172Loose Nukes . ABC-TV News Primetime Live, 14 October 1993
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The next threat organized crime groups pose by these types
of illicit sales is the enhancement of the capabilities of
terrorist groups and other "uncontrollable elements." For
purposes of this thesis, "uncontrollable elements" are best
described as, "countries that have unstable governments or
have a history of aggression or a history of terrorism. " 173
Iran, Iraq and Libya fit this description quite well. On the
surface however, this particular threat may not seem all that
different from what was seen in the past. After all, there
has always been arms traders and weapons smugglers to supply
any group who could pay. Yet, organized crime groups in
Russia add a new dimension to this threat. With Russia's
unstable political, economic, and security environments,
organized crime groups have been provided the unique
opportunity of being able to acquire and supply merchandise
rarely seen in the black market arms trade. As previously
discussed, organized crime groups may now have greater access
to nuclear materials and possibly warheads, the components and
technologies needed to build nuclear weapons, and the
components and technologies necessary to build the means by
which to deliver such weapons. Once in the hand of terrorists
or unstable governments, they could use these newly acquired
weapons or technologies to blackmail other countries.
According to David Kay, Secretary General of the Uranium
173Eric Schmitt, "U.S. Aides Worry About Spread of Arms from
Sales by the Soviets," The New York Times , 11 November 1991, Sec.
I, p. 5 , col . 1
.
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Institute, "In the past it has been easy to dismiss any
terrorists claims involving nuclear weapons as a hoax. This
will not be possible when uncertainty exists over the
whereabouts of weapons -grade material." 174 Furthermore, it is
not unreasonable to believe that a terrorist group, renegade
state, or unstable government, if given the opportunity, may
use a nuclear weapon. Fortunately, the amount of safeguards
built into individual warheads help prevent this from
occurring. But this would only apply if an entire weapon were
stolen, not if these groups acquired the necessary items to
build their own. All this aside, developing nations are
seeking to buy more advanced weapons and technologies, that
organized crime groups are now in a position to sell.
Consequently, when the weapons needs of these groups or
countries are met, it causes an "erosion in the military edge
that enabled Western nations to win so decisively, without
heavy casualties to their own forces, in the Persian Gulf
War . " 175
Nevertheless, it is not just the illicit sale of nuclear
and high- technology weapons and materials that is creating a
significant threat to international security. Illicit sales
of conventional weapons by organized crime groups in Russia,
like other types of arms traffickers, exacerbates tensions and
174David Hughes, "Arms Experts Fear Nuclear Blackmail, " Aviation
Week & S »- :e Technology . 4 January 1993, p. 61.
l75Wi ~s, Sec. A, p. 12, col. 1.
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conflicts in unstable regions around the world. For example,
areas like Somalia, Yugoslavia and Georgia have had, "an
outbreak of nasty little wars equipped with arms leftover from
the big one that never happened." 176 This is due to the fact
that in the early 1980s, conflicts between nationalities
sharply increased the demand for weapons and ammunition. As
a result, organized crime groups in Russia seized upon the
opportunity these situations presented. This fact was
represented by, "an immediate increase in the number of thefts
of weapons from depots and from enterprises that manufacture
those articles." 177 It is safe to assume that the illegal
supply of weapons and ammunition by organized crime groups, or
any proliferator for that matter, serves to prolong armed
conflicts. When these conflicts are prolonged, there will
inevitably be more military and civilian casualties. And as
noted earlier, there is an immense amount of suffering by the
peoples of these regions when their resources are thrown away
on weapons purchases. When these conflicts go on long enough,
hunger, disease, and growing numbers of refugees mandate
costly international humanitarian relief efforts. Besides
weighing heavily on the economic resources of participating
nations, relief missions also tend to be a political nightmare
for those involved. Somalia is a prime example of this
situation. The stakes for the international community are
176Fuhrman, p. 100.
177
"Crime Wave," p. 12.
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raised even further when it comes time to employ peacemaking
and peacekeeping; especially when organized crime groups
continue their illegal activities.
Last of all, the illicit sales of weapons, weapons
components, materials and technologies by organized crime
groups are undermining the non-proliferation efforts of
various international organizations as well as their attempts
to end conflicts. First of all, the IAEA is one of the
organizations that has been assigned to the arduous task of
trying to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the
means by which to deliver them. As exemplified by their
inability to adequately isolate and detect Iraq's nuclear
program, their focus towards making sure that civilian uses of
nuclear power do not evolve into nuclear weapons programs is
insufficient to meet current threats. The threat put forward
by organized crime groups is just one case. Next, United
Nations (UN) embargoes are ineffective in preventing smugglers
as well as organized crime groups from selling weapons,
materials and technologies to embargoed nations. The degree
of sophistication these groups possess in forging documents,
hiding illegal cargoes, and disguising ships, makes embargoes
useless. 178 In Yugoslavia for instance, illicit purchases in
1992 (during an embargo) were estimated at $300.00 million. 179




days, many more get through." 180 Moreover, a group of former
KGB and CIA agents were allegedly caught smuggling weapons to
the embargoed countries of Iraq and Libya. 181 Who knows how
many shipments got through before they were caught. Another
problem is that although non-proliferation has been voiced as
a main concern of organizations such as the IAEA, UN, North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) , Conference on Security
and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) , and North Atlantic
Cooperation Council (NACC)
,
there does not seem to be any
attention being paid to the threats posed by organized crime
groups. Another thought is that international efforts to stop
various countries, such as China, from selling weapons and
weapons technologies may actually be counterproductive. If
successful, these efforts to eliminate sellers has the
unintended consequence of eliminating competition for
organized crime groups. As a result, buyers are forced to
seek out organized crime groups to fill their orders. This




"Firm Said Smuggling Russian Arms to Middle East," from
DAVAR, in Daily Report Western Europe , FBIS-WEU-93 - 159 , 19 August
1993, p. 16; Further information on this particular event could
not be located, but illicit activities involving former KGB and CIA
agents is consistent with other reports.
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X. CONCLUSION
Organized crime groups in Russia have undergone several
transformations in size and types of illicit activities since
the Bolshevik revolution, the most recent of which occurred
after the collapse of communism and the fall of the FSU.
Although the vast number of contemporary organized crime
groups in Russia now engage in a wide variety of criminal
activities, their most recent ventures involve the illicit
sale of weapons, weapons components, strategic and nuclear
materials, and technologies with military applications. These
particular activities are a cause for concern because they
undoubtedly pose a grave threat to regional and international
security with severe implications for U.S. land, air and naval
forces
.
Nonetheless, the fact that weapons and sensitive materials
are now being sold by Russia's organized crime groups should
not come as a surprise. By looking at organized crime groups
in Russia as rational, "corporate like" entities, that seek to
maximize profits and minimize the risks involved in attaining
those profits, their activities can thus be seen as a result
of an assessment process. These groups engage in a process of
assessing the opportunities, risks, and potential benefits of
committing various crimes. Moreover, their assessment is
derived from the status of Russia's political, economic, state
security, and social environments in which they are required
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to operate. When organized crime groups in Russia survey their
environments, they can plainly see a chaotic situation ripe
with opportunities to commit crime with little fear of being
apprehended. Combined with the enormous potential benefits
that can be gained from the illicit sale of weapons and
sensitive materials, it seems quite logical that organized
crime groups in Russia are participating in these particular
activities
.
Consequently, having a thorough knowledge of Russia's
environments and a comprehension of the assessment of those
environments by organized crime groups can be an effective
method for focussing the counter proliferation efforts against
these groups. The key to doing this is to figure out which
particular area in each environment has the biggest impact on
the results of their assessment process. Once this has been
accomplished, these areas could then be targeted for reforms.
When looking at Russia's environments, the easy answer is to
say that all of its environments need major reforms. This may
be true, but given the constraints of a limited budget,
reforms of this magnitude are simply not possible. Moreover,
the reforms that can be accomplished should not interfere with
the ultimate goals of establishing a democracy and a free
market economy (if this is in fact what Russia wants) .
Although an authoritarian rule may appear to be an easy answer
to Russia's organized crime problems, this thesis assumes that
it is not the right answer.
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Some of the environmental reforms that could possibly be
undertaken by Russ a to combat organized crime groups' illicit
sale of weapons and sensitive materials, as well as other
illicit activities, are as follows: 1) Cease the political
infighting and encourage more resolute leadership that is
determined to carry out reform programs. By doing this,
Russia's leadership can then focus on more important issues
(organized crime) , and allow the reform process to continue
unabated; 2) Stop subsidizing inefficient industries. This
will reduce the amount of rubles that need to be printed and
subsequently slow inflation, thereby reducing the chances that
individuals can be bribed to steal weapons and the like; 3)
Encourage the opening of new businesses over conversion or
privatization of existing ones; 4) Develop a legal
infrastructure to cover economic and criminal matters, thus
eliminating the vast array of "loopholes" organized crime
groups can use to avoid prosecution; 5) Improve the methods of
screening for people trying to get loans or take part in the
privatization program in order to prevent access by organized
crime groups. Criminal record and source of income, for
example, could be the focus of the screening; 6) Provide
better training and equipment to law enforcement officials so
they can increase their enforcement capabilities. Although
this is very expensive to do, studies show that the best way
to deter a criminal is to increase the likelihood that he will
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be caught if he commits a crime 182 ; and 7) Put an end to
corruption by political leaders, law enforcement officials,
and other civil servants. Since organized crime groups rely
heavily upon corrupt officials to complete illicit activities,
halting corruption would go along way in limiting these
activities. Of course, putting an end to corruption is not
likely to happen until wages reach the point where people do
not feel they have to commit crime in order to survive.
Nevertheless, the above recommendations are of a fairly
general nature, and there are more specific recommendations
that can be made. To begin with, Russia needs to obtain an
accurate inventory of all weapons and sensitive materials.
Although conducting an inventory would be of no use in solving
past thefts of these items, it would provide a new baseline to
help detect future thefts. In the law enforcement arena, the
establishment of extradition agreements, language and
undercover operations training, and better communication
between the investigative and intelligence functions would go
a long way in building a credible deterrent against the
activities of organized crime groups. As for the legal system
in Russia, a Russian equivalent to the American's RICO Act
should be introduced. In addition, Russia needs to clarify
existing conflict of interest and bribery statutes or
introduce them if absent. Even more importantly, Russia needs
to develop a witness protection program. This program would
182Sullivan, p. 20.
83
not only safeguard the lives of those who witness a crime, but
instill an added measure of security and trust in the minds of
Russia's citizens.
In spite of all the shortcomings in Russia's environments
that allow for the increase in size and degree of activities
of organized crime groups, some positive strides are being
made to combat these groups. For one thing, Russia recognizes
the fact that it has an organized crime problem and is
attempting to coordinate its efforts to fight it. Next,
cooperation with regional and international law enforcement
agencies is being sought out and conducted. As a matter of
fact, technical assistance from the West is one of the best
things that is being done to combat the activities of
organized groups. Although it may appear that financial aid
from the West would also help solve Russia's problems, this is
not a wise idea since Russia does not yet have the ability to
make proper use of it. Finally, Russia is dedicating more
resources to various components within the state security
environment for the purpose of combatting organized crime
groups and their illicit activities. Other efforts are being
made too, but it is clear that Russia's organized crime groups
currently have the upper hand in Russian society for now.
One thing is for sure, Russia's organized crime groups are
not going to go away overnight . Time has shown that these
groups are highly resilient and can adapt to a multitude of
situations. As for the illicit sale of weapons and sensitive
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materials, organized crime groups in Russia will continue to
sell these items as long as the opportunities to do so
continue to exist, and the amount of risk involved can be
justified by the potential benefits to be gained. Judging by
the state of Russia's environments, and the current pace of
the reform process, organized crime groups in Russia have
little to fear in the near future. Moreover, when Russia
reaches the point that these kinds of activities can be
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